Features
Exploit mitigation
Filling holes in the linux security posture
- Remove SUID-root from numerous binaries, replacing functionality using capabilities, and remove
sudo
, su
, and pkexec
entirely in favor of run0
why?
- Disable Xwayland by default (for GNOME, Plasma, and Sway images)
- Mitigation of LD_PRELOAD attacks via
ujust toggle-bash-environment-lockdown
- Require wheel user authentication via polkit for
rpm-ostree install
why?
- Disable install & usage of GNOME user extensions by default
- Disable KDE GHNS by default why?
- Removal of the unmaintained and suid-root fuse2 by default
- Disabling unprivileged user namespaces by default for the unconfined domain and the container domain why?
Security by default
- Disabling all ports and services for firewalld
- Use HTTPS for all rpm mirrors
- Set all default container policies to
reject
, signedBy
, or sigstoreSigned
- Enabling only the flathub-verified remote by default
- Adds per-network MAC randomization
- Disabling coredumps
Attack surface reduction
- Blacklisting numerous unused kernel modules to reduce attack surface details
- Brute force protection by locking user accounts for 24 hours after 50 failed login attempts, hardened password encryption and password quality suggestions
- Disable and mask a variety of services by default (including cups, geoclue, passim, and others)
Security ease-of-use
- Installing bubblejail for additional sandboxing tooling
- Tooling for automatically setting up and enabling LUKS TPM2 integration for unlocking LUKS drives
- Tooling for automatically setting up and enabling LUKS FIDO2 integration for unlocking LUKS drives
- Toggles for controlling access to unprivileged user namespaces via SELinux
- Toggles for a variety of the hardening set by default, for user convenience (
ujust --choose
)